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Second, on the question of ground forces,
although NATO planners have reviewed a
broad range of options, some of which would
involve ground forces in hostile cir-
cumstances, I can assure you the United
States would not support these options and
there currently is no sentiment in NATO for
such a mission. The mission under consider-
ation involves the use of graduated air
power, not military forces on the ground.
In the event that Milosevic agrees to com-
ply with UNSCR 1199, and if there is a subse-
quent political settlement, some form of
international presence may be needed.
Whether this can be done entirely by inter-
national civilian personnel and whether
Americans should participate are matters we
will need to consider in the context of any
such agreement and with full consultations
with the Congress.
Third, regarding the nature of the air cam-
paign in Kosovo, NATO has developed a clear
military plan. It entails the graduated but
effective use of air power harnessed to two
achievable objectives. The primary objective
is by threat of force, or its use, to persuade
Milosevic to comply with the demands of
United Nations Security Council Resolution
1199. If initial use of air power does not re-
sult in compliance, NATO's secondary objec-
tive is to strike Belgrade's military capabili-
ties in ways that will damage his ability to
conduct repressive operations in Kosovo, the
same objective you identify in your letter.
Let me assure you that NATO planning
provides for air power to be used effectively.
There will be no ``pin prick'' strikes. Even
the initial use of air power will send a very
clear signal of our ability to disrupt oper-
ations by the FRY military and special po-
lice, and follow-on phases will progressively
expand in their scale and scope. These oper-
ations are planned to involve virtually all
NATO allies.
Finally, regarding your desire for a clear
policy linked to our national interests and a
defined end-state, NATO air power will be
used as part of a broader political strategy
to advance our overall objectives of promot-
ing a political settlement and averting a hu-
manitarian catastrophe. We are not replac-
ing diplomacy with military force; rather we
are combining the two to achieve our objec-
tives. Secretary Albright recently dis-
patched Ambassador Holbrooke to the region
to make crystal clear to Milosevic what
steps he needs under UNSC 1199 to take to
avoid NATO air strikes. Even if Milosevic
gives NATO no choice but to execute air
strikes, we will use them in a way designed
to help bring an end to Serbian operations in
Kosovo, voluntarily or involuntarily.
Our desired end-state in Kosovo is clear,
comprising three parts. Our immediate ob-
jective is to achieve full compliance with UN
Security Council resolution 1199, thus reduc-
ing the risk of wider conflict, averting a hu-
manitarian catastrophe and lessening the
chance of further atrocities. Our mid-term
objective is to secure a political settlement
that grants broad autonomy to the Kosovars,
while keeping Kosovo within the FRY. In
particular, the agreement should ensure that
the Kosovars have their own bodies of gov-
ernment and police. Our longer-term objec-
tive is a FRY that is democratic and on the
path to European integration. This requires
a responsible government that is account-
able to its own citizens, of all ethnic back-
grounds, and that carries out its obligations
abroad, including in Bosnia. In this regard,
we continue to support opposition parties
and free and independent media in the FRY.
Further efforts in these areas are an impor-
tant part of our broader strategy.
The United Nations, the Contact Group,
NATO and my Administration all agree that
Milosevic bears primary responsibility for
the current situation including the brutal
tactics of his security forces. Not only has he
displaced a quarter million of his own citi-
zens, but he has also suppressed the human
rights of all citizens of the FRY and forced
them to bear the burden of the current con-
flict, of UN economic sanctions and of isola-
tion from the rest of Europe.
While Milosevic bears primary responsibil-
ity for the current crisis, there are others
whose actions could prolong and exacerbate
it. I am referring in particular to the various
armed insurgent groups in Kosovo, including
the Kosovar Liberation Army, or UCK. Am-
bassador Holbrooke this week delivered a
firm message to these groups to cooperate in
bringing about a peaceful solution. Armed
reprisals against Serb civilians, or the con-
tinued pursuit of independence by military
means, will only shatter a cease-fire and the
hopes of attaining a political settlement
that gives Kosovo true autonomy. We have
told them that failure to cooperate will
cause us to reassess our operations against
the Serbs.
Larry Eagleburger, our former ambassador
to Yugoslavia, once said that the war in
Yugoslavia began in Kosovo and will ulti-
mately end there. His prediction was correct.
Our job is to bring that war to an end, to
keep it from destabilizing the region and to
avert a humanitarian catastrophe. I appre-
ciate your willingness to work with the Ad-
ministration to protect American interests
in southeastern Europe. We will continue to





TRIBUTE TO ADMIRAL T. JOSEPH
LOPEZ ON THE OCCASION OF HIS
RETIREMENT
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise
today to pay tribute to Admiral Joe
Lopez on the occasion of his Change of
Command as Commander of Allied
Forces, Southern Europe and U.S.
Naval Forces, Europe and his retire-
ment from the United States Navy
after 39 years of dedicated service to
the nation.
Joe Lopez joined the United States
Navy to see the worldÐand see the
world he did. A native of Powellton,
West Virginia, he enlisted in the Navy
in September 1959. In 1964, he was com-
missioned an Ensign via the Seaman-
to-Admiral Program and upon commis-
sioning, he was assigned first to the
U.S.S. Eugene A. Greene (DD 711) and
then to the U.S.S. Lind (DD 703). While
onboard both of these destroyers, he
saw action in Vietnam.
Admiral Lopez received his first com-
mand in September 1969, when he as-
sumed the duties as Commander, River
Assault Division 153, which operated in
the Mekong Delta in Vietnam and as
part of a counter-offensive into Cam-
bodia in May 1970. Admiral Lopez was
the only Navy commanding officer to
lead a river assault into Cambodia.
Following tours of duty at the Naval
Postgraduate School, the Armed
Forces Staff College, and as Flag Sec-
retary and Staff Officer for Com-
mander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group
Eight, Admiral Lopez served as the Ex-
ecutive Officer onboard the U.S.S.
Truett (FF 1095) from 1977 to 1979. While
he was XO, the Truett operated in the
Mediterranean and Red Seas.
Admiral Lopez commanded the
U.S.S. Stump (DD 978) from September
1982 to November 1984. As the CO of
Stump he completed a Persian Gulf de-
ployment. Admiral Lopez' next com-
mand tour was as Commander, De-
stroyer Squadron 32, which deployed to
the Mediterranean Sea. He followed his
Squadron Commander assignment with
duties as Executive Assistant to the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Manpower, Personnel and Training and
as Executive Assistant to the Vice
Chief of Naval Operations.
Admiral Lopez was promoted to Rear
Admiral in July 1989. He served as De-
fense Secretary Dick Cheney's senior
military assistant from July 1990 to
July 1992 including during the Persian
Gulf Conflict. From July 1992 to De-
cember 1993, he commanded the United
States Sixth Fleet and NATO's Strik-
ing and Support Forces, Southern Eu-
rope, homeported in Gaeta, Italy.
For the next three years he served as
the Navy's senior acquisition official,
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Resources, Warfare Requirements
and Assessments. He led the Navy's
transition to a force that is able to op-
erate effectively in the littorals. His
accomplishments include helping to de-
velop the next generation of nuclear-
powered attack submarines, the re-
cently named Virginia class of fast at-
tack subs, which are being built jointly
by Newport News Shipbuilding and
Electric Boat.
Admiral Lopez became Commander
in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces,
Southern Europe on 31 July 1996. As
CINC AFSOUTH, he commanded the
Peace Implementation Forces (IFOR)
in Bosnia-Herzegovina from July 1996
to November 1996.
Tomorrow, at a ceremony at Head-
quarters AFSOUTH in Naples Italy,
after more than two years as the senior
military commander in NATO's south-
ern region, Admiral Lopez will relin-
quish command to Admiral James O.
Ellis, Jr. The ceremony will also mark
the retirement of Admiral Joe Lopez
after a 39-year Navy career.
Mr. President, Admiral Lopez has
had a tremendous career and I wish to
thank him for the superb job he has
done as Commander in Chief of Allied
Forces, Southern Europe and U.S.
Naval Forces Europe. He demonstrated
outstanding leadership as commander
of the NATO forces in charge of enforc-
ing the Dayton Peace Agreement. In
my travels to that war-torn region of
the world I have come to know Admiral
Lopez well. We have traveled together
on official business. On many occa-
sions, I have visited Joe and his wife
Vivian at their quarters in Naples, and
have sought the Admiral's counsel, es-
pecially on the volatile situations in
the Balkans. Admiral Joe Lopez is a
man of vision and an astute realist. I
will continue to seek his counsel dur-
ing his retirement.
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I congratulate Joe and Vivian Lopez
upon the completion of their active
duty Navy career and thank them for
their service to the country. And fi-
nally, I want to thank Admiral Lopez
for his friendship and honest counsel
over the years. Since the closing days
of World War II, 1945, I have known and
served with many sailors. I rank him
at the top, a ``4.0 seaman patriot.''
f
DEVELOPMENTS IN KOSOVO
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I
thank Senator WARNER for speaking
about Kosovo. I am disappointed that
the Senate has not brought a resolu-
tion to the floor and had a debate
about what our response should be as a
Nation to what is happening in Kosovo.
I think it is a profound mistake on our
part not to have this discussion given
the fact that we are going to adjourn
within the next couple of days.
Mr. President, I want to be held ac-
countable. I think we should all be held
accountable as to what our viewpoints
are and what we think our country
should or should not do.
Mr. President, while there have been
some indications in recent days that
the slaughter of innocent civilians has
slowedÐat least temporarilyÐwe can-
not afford to turn our attention away
from the situation there.
President Milosevic claims to have
ordered some units of his army back to
their barracks, but it is too early to
tell exactly what these actions mean
and whether Milosevic actually intends
to cease his brutal offensive against
the Albanian Kosovars. There is con-
siderable evidence that he may not be
truly pulling back in accordance with
Western demands, but rather taking
halfway measures that would allow his
troops and tanks to return to the fight-
ing almost immediately. UN Secretary
General Annan reported earlier this
week that there is still a significant
presence of Serb armed forces in
Kosovo, and that some special police
units are continuing punitive oper-
ations against the local population. I
remain deeply skeptical about
Milosevic's intentions.
We have had too much experience
with Milosevic to take his statements
at face value and to assume that the
killing has really ended. We have seen
his defiance of world opinion and inter-
national law for years. Recently we
were all shocked by the horrific mas-
sacres of civiliansÐthe massacre of
women, elderly men, even young chil-
dren and infants. These killings, attrib-
uted to Serb security forces, are an af-
front to the international community.
Now it looks as if Milosevic may
have ordered a partial withdrawal of
his attack forces, hoping to avoid im-
minent military action by NATO. He
may believe that if the killings stop for
a time, the attention of NATO and the
U.S. will turn elsewhere. We must not
allow that to happen. We must keep
our focus on the crisis in Kosovo, and
not become distracted by other issues.
Unless immediate action is taken to
forestall a humanitarian tragedy, we
may soon see even more disturbing and
gruesome pictures from Kosovo. With
an estimated 150,000 people in Kosovo
living out in the open without any
shelter and with winter approaching,
international relief agencies now fear
that tens of thousands of those dis-
placed persons could face severe hard-
ship and some even death from expo-
sure unless they can return to their
homes or be provided adequate shelter
within the next couple of weeks.
The situation on the ground in
Kosovo is heartbreaking. According to
a report from a representative of the
International Rescue Committee who
recently visited the Kosovo country-
side, young children are wandering
around in the hills barefoot or in
ripped sandals. Extended families of
several generations are sleeping 15 to
20 to a tent. The tents are clear plastic
supported only by bent saplings. Moth-
ers are desperate to return home. Even
if their houses are burned they would
rather sleep in tents in their own yards
then in the inhospitable hills. But they
are afraid to return home, because
every time they try to return snipers
shoot at them.
As the IRC report relates, these dis-
placed Kosovars are trying to survive
in areas where there is no food, no shel-
ter, no schools for the children, no la-
trine system, and no other basic infra-
structure. They have only the clothes
they were wearing when they fled in
the summer. The children have diar-
rhea from the dirty water and lack of
sanitation. Parents watch, worried, as
their children vomit all night and be-
come dehydrated. Soon they will also
have to face snow and freezing cold.
These appalling conditions cannot
continue. We must get aid to this ter-
rorized population swiftly. But we can
only get relief to them if Milosevic
ceases his repression and allows relief
agencies unfettered access.
The Administration and our NATO
allies must keep the pressure on
Milosevic to put an end to Serb mili-
tary action in Kosovo and to comply
with the demands of the UN Security
Council resolution of September 23.
That resolution demands that both
parties cease hostilities and maintain a
cease-fire. The resolution also calls on
Belgrade to (1) cease all action by the
security forces affecting the civilian
population and order the withdrawal of
security forces used for civilian repres-
sion; (2) allow free access for inter-
national diplomatic monitors in
Kosovo and unimpeded access for hu-
manitarian organizations and supplies
to Kosovo and; (3) make rapid progress
on a clear timetable in conducting au-
tonomy talks with the Kosovo Alba-
nian community.
I have also been encouraged that
NATO has instructed its military com-
manders to begin preparations for pos-
sible military action and that NATO
members have informed NATO Com-
mand what forces and equipment they
are prepared to supply for actions in
the Kosovo region.
I have always been a Senator who in-
sists that military actions abroad
should always be a last resort. I still
hope and pray, as a Senator from Min-
nesota, that in this situation we will
not have to resort to force. I view it as
a last option if we cannot resolve this
situation by diplomatic means. But I
also recognize that we cannot rule out
the use of force, including the use of
air strikes, in this situation. If the
killing resumes or if Milosevic pre-
vents relief from getting to the dis-
placed Kosovars and fails to comply
with the UN resolution and the de-
mands of the international community,
we may have to resort to military ac-
tion.
I met with Milosevic once. I wanted
to see firsthand the genocide of several
years ago. He was the first and only
person I have met that I would not
shake hands with. I don't think he can
be believed, and I think that we have
to send him a forceful message.
To prepare for possible implementa-
tion of more forceful options developed
by NATO planners, we should continue
to move forward now, under NATO aus-
pices, with pre-deployment in the re-
gion of appropriate levels of NATO
military equipment and forces. This
would include such actions as pre-posi-
tioning aircraft and naval vessels, and
deployment of necessary materiel to
support NATO troops.
These moves would be intended to
send another clear message to
Milosevic that he must comply with
the UN Security Council Resolution
immediately. If he does not respond we
must be ready to take further steps to
force compliance as necessary.
At the same time, we need to take
other actions to keep the pressure on
Milosevic. The U.S. should press for-
ward on an intensified multilateral ef-
fort, at the United Nations and through
regional bodies like the European
Union, to firmly tighten the existing
sanctions regime on Serbia, to re-im-
pose other sanctions lifted after sign-
ing of the Dayton Peace Accord, and to
otherwise increase pressure on
Milosevic to comply.
We must also accelerate U.S. and
NATO logistical support for the ongo-
ing international humanitarian aid ef-
fort in Kosovo, including pre-deploy-
ment of humanitarian supplies in
Kosovo in anticipation of winter dis-
tribution by non-governmental organi-
zations, while ensuring the safety and
security of those who will rely on such
aid.
There must be no repeat of the dis-
graceful Bosnian ``safe haven'' disaster
of Srebrenica.
The U.S. and NATO must also press
for immediate and unrestricted access
in Kosovo for internationally-recog-
nized human rights monitoring organi-
zations, including the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe,
and increase aid and intelligence sup-
port to the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
